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It has often been argued that the spectacular cognitive capacities
of humans are the result of selection for the ability to gather,
process and use information about other people. Recent studies
show that humans strongly and consistently differ in what type of
social information they are interested in. While some individuals
mainly attend to what the majority is doing (frequency-based
learning), others focus on the success that their peers achieve with
their behavior (success-based learning). Here we show that such
differences in social learning have important consequences for the
outcome of social interactions. We report on a decision-making
experiment where individuals were ﬁrst classiﬁed as frequency-
and success-based learners and subsequently grouped according
to their learning strategy. When confronted with a social dilemma
situation, groups of frequency-based learners cooperated consid-
erably more than groups of success-based learners. A detailed
analysis of the decision-making process reveals that the e differ-
ences in cooperation are a direct result of the differences in infor-
mation use. Our results show that individual differences in social
learning strategies are crucial for understanding social behavior.
cooperation j individual differences j cultural evolution j personality
j decision making
Introduction
Acquiring information about others is a prominent feature of
the human behavioral repertoire (1-3). Observing the behavior of
others can allow individuals to improve their own knowledge and
skills, but it can also be instrumental in anticipating how others
will behave in future social interactions. Clues that help to predict
how others will behave can allow for better coordination, or for
being able to outsmart others for personal gain (4, 5). Indeed, the
ability to keep a mental tab about the past actions of others has
been put forward as one of the main mechanisms that allowed for
the evolution of cooperation in humans (6, 7).
This focus on social information comes with a spectacular
capacity to imitate. Imitation and other forms of social learning
govern the spread of information between individuals and are
therefore at the basis of cultural change. Indeed, it has been
argued that these mechanisms of transmission underlie a pro-
cess of cultural evolution, which is in many ways analogous to
genetic evolution (8-10). Social learning has allowed humans to
rapidly adapt to all kinds of environmental circumstances, and is
ultimately responsible for the wide variety of languages, habits,
forms of organization, and social norms that are found across
cultures (11-14). Because of this, social learning and its group-
level consequences have been the object of considerable scientific
scrutiny. Laboratory studies and theoretical models have gone
hand in hand in respectively identifying the social learning strate-
gies that people use (15-18), and determining how these different
strategies are shaped by selection (19-21) and affect the outcome
of cultural evolution (22-26). The framework of cultural evolution
has been successfully applied for a range of purposes, such as
understanding the spread and the loss of technologies in human
societies (27, 28) and inferring the ancestry of cultural traits such
as language and political organization (39-31).
Although there has been extensive focus on identifying the
rules that humans use to learn from each other, the possibility
that people may differ in the way they learn from others has
long been ignored. Only recently, several studies (32-35) have
suggested that there is substantial individual variation in the
extent to which people use social information, and in the type
of information they are interested in. Some individuals focus on
information about the success of others (paying attention to both
their decisions and the associated payoffs), whereas others are
only interested in the frequencies with which behaviors occur in
their social group (disregarding information about the payoffs
others obtained). Moreover, individuals tend to use the same
social learning strategy across different (social and non-social)
contexts (34). However, it is not clear how the focus on different
types of social information might affect the outcome of social
interactions.
In this study, we examine the consequences of individual
variation in human social learning strategies on the outcome
of cooperative interactions. For this, we conducted a decision-
making experiment that consisted of two parts that took place one
month apart. In Part 1, subjects were divided in groups and con-
fronted with a number of different interaction settings. In each
interaction round, they were allowed to view a limited amount of
information about their peers’ previous behavior and earnings. In
Part 2, we assorted the same subjects in groups based on the social
learning strategies they had employed in Part 1, creating groups
of success-based learners and frequency-based learners. These
groups were confronted with a cooperation setting, in which each
subject had to decide between a selfish option and an option that
benefitted the group. We analyze the outcome of the interactions
in these groups and investigate whether, and to what extent,
Signiﬁcance
We report on a two-step decision-making experiment. The
ﬁrst part shows that humans differ consistently in the way
they learn from others. Some individuals are success-based
learners, who try to identify successful peers and mimic their
behavior. Others are frequency-based learners, who tend to
adopt the most frequent behavior in their group. The second
part reveals that these differences in social learning have im-
portant consequences for the outcome of social interactions.
In situations where participants had to choose between a
selﬁsh option and an option beneﬁtting their group, groups of
frequency-based learners achieved considerably higher levels
of cooperation than groups of success-based learners. This is
the ﬁrst clear experimental evidence that learning strategies
are an important determinant of social behavior.
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Fig. 1. Consistent individual differences in social learning strategies. In Part 1 of the experiment, 86.7% of all information requests fell into two categories:
subjects either asked for frequency-information (i.e. the decisions of all four group members in the previous round) or they asked for success-information
(i.e. the combination of decision and corresponding payoff for two group members in the previous round). (a) Classiﬁcation of individuals with respect to
the fraction of requests an individual targeted at success-information in Part 1 of the experiment. In each social context, the histogram reveals a U-shaped
distribution: most individuals had extreme social learning strategies, either requestingmainly success-information or requestingmainly frequency-information.
(b) Consistency of social learning strategies across the three social contexts in Part 1 of the experiment. For each context, individuals were classiﬁed as either
focused on frequency (more than 50% of their requests used for frequency-information) or focused on success (more than 50% used for success-information).
The graph depicts the 8 possible combinations of frequency- and success-focus across the three social contexts; the size of the circles indicating the number
of individuals falling in each category. The individuals that were consistent over all social contexts are highlighted; consistent frequency-based learners (69)
in orange and consistent success-based learners (23) in purple. 92 of the 145 subjects (63.4%) that requested information in at least one round of each
social context were consistent across all three contexts. (c)Consistency in the number of information requests over time (between Part 1 and Part 2 of the
experiment, summed over all social contexts) and (d)consistency in type of information requested between Part 1 and Part 2 (the fraction of information
pieces requested that were used for success-information, over all social contexts). In both cand d, the size of the dots indicates number of individuals (the
smallest dots representing single individuals), and the red lines represent linear regressions (in both cases, R2 = 0.454, P < 0.001).
differences in cooperation can be traced back to differences in
social learning style.
Results
In Part 1 of the experiment, 200 subjects were divided in groups
of five and confronted with four different interaction contexts
in randomized order (non-social, cooperation, coordination and
evasion). In each context, they made decisions between two
options for 20 consecutive interaction rounds. Their decision
resulted in a payoff that depended on the type of the social
interaction, the decisions of their fellow group members, and also
included an element of random noise. Before making a decision,
subjects were given the opportunity to view a maximum of four
‘pieces of information’ about their fellow group members at a
small cost, where one piece of information consisted of either a
previous payoff or a previous decision of a fellow group member.
The four interaction contexts we offered are consistent with those
considered in our earlier study (34), but here we focus on the
three social contexts.
The results of Part 1 fully confirm the earlier observation that
there are marked individual differences in both the amount of
social information that individuals request, and the type of infor-
mation they are interested in (34). A largemajority of information
requests (86.7%) were of two types: individuals either requested
the decisions of the four fellow group members in the previous
round (henceforth referred to as frequency-information), or they
requested both the decision and the payoff of two fellow group
members (success-information). Figure 1a classifies all individ-
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Submission PDFFig. 2. Groups of frequency-based learners achieved higher levels of cooper-
ation than groups of success-based learners. Bars show average cooperation
rates (± 1 SEM) over all rounds of the social dilemma context in Part 2. Data
are based on 16 groups of frequency-based learners, 8 mixed groups and 8
groups of success-based learners. The P-value shown in the graph refers to a
Tukey-Kramer test.
uals with respect to what type of information they requested
in each social context. In all contexts, we find U-shaped dis-
tributions, indicating that most subjects consistently focused on
either frequency-information or success-information. Figure 1b
demonstrates that most subjects were also consistent across the
different contexts; almost two thirds of individuals always focused
on the same type of information in all three social contexts.
In Part 2, 160 of the subjects that had participated in Part
1 were assorted in groups of five based on their social learning
strategies, resulting in 16 groups of frequency-based learners, 8
groups of success-based learners, and 8 mixed groups (consisting
of individuals with varying social learning strategies) as a control.
These groups were confronted with the same interaction settings
as in Part 1, again for 20 consecutive rounds, but the settings
were presented in a different way (see Materials and Methods
for details). Figure 1c and 1d show that individual information
use was strongly correlated between Part 1 and Part 2. Subjects
were consistent in both the extent to which they requested social
information (Figure 1c) and the type of information that they
focused on (Figure 1d). Apparently, subjects stuck to their social
learning strategy for the one-month period separating Parts 1 and
2. In conclusion, the experiment provides independent confirma-
tion for individual variation in social learning strategies and their
consistency across different contexts, and it suggests that these
differences are stable over longer time periods.
Here we provide a detailed analysis of the effect of group
assortment with respect to social learning on the subjects’ be-
havior in the cooperation setting (see Figure S1 for the two
other types of social interaction). The cooperation setting was a
social dilemma; a situation in which individuals have to choose
between their own interest (defection) and the interest of the
group they are in (cooperation). In our experiment, cooperation
raised the payoffs of all fellow group members, but came at a
cost to the cooperating individual. Accordingly, it is advantageous
to be in a group of cooperators, but defection is associated with
an individually higher payoff irrespective of the behavior of the
others. Also in this part, there was some random noise added to
each payoff, so that it could occur that cooperation paid off better
than defection (see Materials and Methods for details).
As shown in Figure 2, the group composition with regard to
learning strategy had a systematic and significant effect on the
level of cooperation achieved in the group (One-way ANOVA,
F = 4.772, P = 0.016). In particular, the cooperation level was
significantly higher in groups of frequency-based learners than in
groups of success-based learners (Tukey-Kramer test, P= 0.013),
while the cooperation level in mixed groups (mostly composed of
individuals with inconsistent learning strategies) was intermedi-
ate. Due to the higher cooperation levels, average payoffs were
significantly higher in groups of frequency-based learners than in
groups of success-based learners (One-way ANOVA, F = 5.083,
P= 0.013; Tukey-Kramer test: P= 0.014). These results strongly
suggest that differences in social learning strategies affect the
outcome of social interactions.
How do the observed differences in cooperation level arise?
One possibility is that frequency-based learners simply have a
stronger tendency to cooperate. Our data do not support this:
in the first round of the interaction, when decisions were not yet
influenced by social information, cooperation levels did not differ
between frequency-based learners and success-based learners
(respectively 0.362±0.054 and 0.350±0.076; Fisher’s exact test, P
=0.839). Another possibility is that the different cooperation lev-
els are the direct result of the different social learning strategies.
To investigate this in more detail, we zoom in on how different
types of social information affect subsequent behavior.
Figure 3a shows how subjects behaved after viewing success-
information (both the decisions and the payoffs of two fellow
group members in the previous round). Subjects were most likely
to switch behavior (from cooperation to defection or vice versa)
if they observed that others achieved substantially higher pay-
offs with the opposite behavior. Interestingly, this effect was
equally strong for subjects that defected in the previous round
and subjects that cooperated. In addition, subjects were gener-
ally conservative; if the observed payoff difference in favor of
the other behavior was small, they tended not to change their
behavior. Apart from this tendency to conservatism, the observed
patterns are consistent with success-based learning as it is often
implemented in models of cultural evolution (22, 26).
Figure 3b illustrates how subjects behaved after viewing
frequency-information (the decisions of their four fellow group
members in the previous round). In this case, the response to
information was strongly affected by an individual’s own previous
behavior. After having defected in the previous round, subjects
were relatively likely to switch to cooperation (35% of the cases).
Interestingly, this switching rate did not depend on the social
information they just viewed; it was the same irrespective of the
number of fellow group members that cooperated in the previous
round. In contrast, subjects who had cooperated in the previous
round were responsive to the information they received. The
more cooperators they observed among their fellow group mem-
bers, the more likely they were to continue cooperating them-
selves. Although this latter pattern has an element of conformism,
frequency-based learning as observed in our experiment is quite
distinct from conformism as it is generally represented in models
of cultural evolution (10, 25, 26). In such models, conformism is
typically modelled by a symmetric S-shaped function indicating
that copying a behavior becomes disproportionally more likely
the more common the behavior is in the population, causing the
common behavior to become even more common over time.
Could the differences in cooperation level between groups
of frequency-based learners and groups of success-based learners
(as shown in Figure 2) be fully explained by the response patterns
to both types of information (Figure 3)? To investigate this, we
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Submission PDFFig. 3. Cooperation rates after viewing frequency-information and success-information. (a) Probability of cooperation after viewing success-informationabout two fellow groupmembers, as a function of the difference between the own previous payoff and the observed previous payoffs of others (only instances
where the opposite behavior was observed are included). Both after cooperation (blue circles and lines) and after defection (red circles and lines), individuals
were more likely to switch their behavior if they observed that the opposite behavior had yielded a higher payoff (logistic regressions, respectively d.f. = 282,
P < 0.001; d.f. = 268, P < 0.001). (b) Probability of cooperation after viewing frequency-information about all four fellow group members, as a function of the
number of fellow group members that cooperated in the previous round. Individuals that cooperated in the previous round (blue circles) were more likely to
cooperate again if they observed that more fellow group members cooperated (blue line: logistic regression, d.f. = 703, P < 0.001). The number of observed
cooperators did not have an effect on cooperation rates when individuals defected in the previous round (red circles; red line: logistic regression, d.f. = 763,
P = 0.937). In both aandb, the size of the circles (as well as the numbers inside them) represent the number of observations. Data are based on pooled results
from Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment (the patterns are similar for both Parts separately; see Figure S2).
Fig. 4. Simulation of the effect of social learning strategy on cooperation
in a social dilemma. Change in cooperation rates over time for groups of
ﬁve, containing only frequency-based learners (orange lines) or only success-
based learners (purple lines). Lines represent averages over 100,000 replicate
simulations. For both scenarios, all possible starting conditions with regard
to the initial number of cooperators are shown. The social learning strategies
used in the simulations are simpliﬁed cartoon versions of the learning rules
observed in the experiment (as shown in ﬁgure 3).
implemented simplified cartoon versions of the observed learning
strategies in a simulation model. In the simulations, we used
the same payoff functions (and payoff noise level) as in the
experiment, and assumed that individuals are equally likely to
request information as observed in the experiment. The proba-
bility of cooperating after not requesting information was also
parameterized fromour experimental observations. As illustrated
in Figure 4, the differences in social learning rules can indeed
account for the observed differences in cooperation.
Discussion
The results of our study can be summarized in three main points.
First, our study confirms with an independent experiment that
individuals differ systematically and consistently in their social
learning strategies. Second, we show for the first time that the
differences in learning strategies are stable over a longer time pe-
riod, much like aspects of personality. Third, we demonstrate that
individual differences in social learning strategies can strongly
affect the outcome of social interactions. In particular, groups
of success-based learners reach lower levels of cooperation than
groups of frequency-based learners.
Our experiment was designed to investigate the effect of
social learning strategies on the outcome of social interactions.
Accordingly, we consider the finding that the cooperation level
achieved in groups of success-based learners is considerably lower
than cooperation in frequency-based learners the main result of
this study. There were no differences in cooperation between
frequency-based learners and success-based learners levels in the
first interaction round. This suggests that the diverging coopera-
tion levels do not result from differences in general cooperation
tendencies, but are a direct result of how the learning strategies
affect behavior. This is also supported by our simulation model.
Intuitively, the effect of an individual’s social learning strategy on
their cooperative behavior can be understood as follows. In a so-
cial dilemma, defection yields individually higher payoffs than co-
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operation, so success-based learning is likely to lead to low levels
of cooperation. Frequency-based learners are not as focused on
information about payoffs and are therefore less inclined to adopt
the individually better-paying option (in this case, defection).
Additionally, high levels of cooperation can be sustained by a
positive feedback in groups of frequency-based learners: themore
fellow group members are observed to cooperate, the higher the
inclination of individuals to continue cooperation themselves.
Although this was not the main focus of our study, we provide
strong support for our earlier finding (34) that humans differ
consistently in their social learning strategies. On purpose, we
modified the set-up of our experiment in several ways from that
of our earlier study: groups were smaller, payoffs and informa-
tion cost were different, the degree of random noise on payoffs
was higher, and subjects were allowed to request fewer pieces
of information. Despite these differences, the vast majority of
subjects in both studies consistently used one of two learning
strategies, irrespective of the social context. This strongly sug-
gests that individual differences in social learning strategies are
a robust phenomenon. This conclusion is further strengthened
by the finding that the subjects of the present study tended to
use the same learning strategy in Part 2 of the experiment as
in Part 1. In other words, differences in social learning strategy
seem to be stable over time, at least over a period of one month.
Model studies suggest that such time-stability can have important
implications, e.g. for signaling intentions and for coordinating
behavior within groups (36-39). Yet, such time-stability is rarely
investigated in experimental studies. Our study is a first step,
but experiments spanning a longer time period and specifically
designed to study time-stability are required to really judge the
stability of differences in social learning strategies.
The finding that individuals differ systematically, stably, and
consistently in their learning strategies has important implications
for the interpretation of empirical data, irrespective of whether
these data are collected in the lab or in a field setting. For
example, an interesting recent study on social learning strategies
in a social dilemma in 14 Indian villages neither found support for
conformism, nor for success-based learning (40). However, this
conclusion is based on a statistical analysis that implicitly assumes
that the underlying population is homogeneous with respect to
social learning strategies. Even if conformism or success-based
learning are not observed at the aggregate level, it is very well
possible that the population is heterogeneous, harboring two or
more coexisting social learning strategies.
The idea that humans differ fundamentally in the way they
gather information was already suggested by Jung (41), but has
received relatively little attention in modern systems of personal-
ity categorization such as the Five FactorModel (41, 43). Thismay
be an important shortcoming; if individuals differ systematically
in the way they collect, interpret and respond to information,
they will also differ systematically in their behavior. This insight
can have important implications for the interpretation of individ-
ual differences. Observed behavioral variation need not reflect
differences in mental, physiological, or motivational states, but
may instead result from differences in social learning strategies.
Experimental studies designed to distinguish between these po-
tential causes can help provide proximate explanations of how
consistent individual differences in behavior come about.
Why should individuals differ in the way they collect and
respond to social information? Are these differences perhaps
‘adaptive’, that is, have they been shaped by (genetic or cultural)
evolution? Questions like this currently play a central role in
animal behavior studies (36, 44), where consistent individual
differences have been described in hundreds of species across
the entire animal kingdom (45, 46). Theoretical studies reveal
that individual differences in social responsiveness (or ‘social
sensitivity’) can arise through frequency-dependent selection,
leading to the stable coexistence of responsive types (that condi-
tion their behavior on social information) and unresponsive types
(that do not use information about others) (47). Differences in
the use of social information may also be the result of evolution;
modelling studies could shed more light on whether and how
evolution could lead to such an outcome.
In the cooperation setting investigated in our study, groups
of frequency-based learners achieved higher payoffs than groups
of success-based learners. If frequency-based learning generally
leads to superior payoffs, how can we explain that success-based
learning still occurs in a social dilemma? This may be an ill-posed
question. The fact that individuals consistently employ the same
social learning strategy in different social contexts suggests that
learning rules have not been tailored to perform optimally in
every single context. This is in line with the view that evolution
does not produce perfect behavior for every circumstance, but
rather leads to the emergence of general-purpose strategies, or
heuristics, that perform relatively well across the whole range of
circumstances that an organismmay face (48, 49). It is conceivable
that frequency-based learning is superior under some circum-
stances, while success-based learning is superior under other
circumstances. Moreover, learning strategies might complement
each other, leading to a faster spread of insights and technologies
in groups harboring different learning strategies (34).
The link between frequency-based learning and coopera-
tion has received quite some attention in the literature around
the topic of ‘cultural group selection’. This literature discusses
the spread of cooperation through competition between groups,
when individuals use conformist learning: the disproportional
tendency to copy the majority behavior. Since this type of
frequency-based learning reduces variation within groups relative
to variation between groups, it makes selection between groups
more effective. Some have argued that this increases the scope
for the cultural evolution of group-beneficial traits (such as coop-
eration) (10, 50-54). However, conformism itself is neutral with
regard to the content of behavior – it makes it extremely difficult
for any behavior, including cooperation, to spread when initially
rare (25, 55). Our experiment did not consider competition be-
tween groups, but rather measured the consequences of different
learning strategies for the spread of cooperation within groups.
Although frequency-based learning was employed by a large pro-
portion of the subjects, it was quite distinct from conformism as it
is usually modeled. In fact, frequency-based learning as observed
in our experiment did not reduce variation within groups; it led
to intermediate levels of cooperation. Also, our results strongly
suggest that frequency-based learning in a social dilemma is not
neutral with respect to behavior; subjects that defected in the
previous round responded to information quite differently from
those who cooperated. It would be interesting to develop a model
of cultural group selection including both individual differences in
social learning strategies and more refined versions of frequency-
based learning (as observed in our experiment). It is conceivable
that such a model could not only explain the evolutionary stability
of cooperation (due to cultural group selection), but also the
spread of cooperation when initially rare.
Materials and methods
A total of 200 subjects (mostly students, mean age: 22.9, 68.5% female)
participated in the study in a laboratory at the University of Groningen. Part
1 and Part 2 consisted of respectively ten and eight sessions of 20 subjects
each. In both parts, subjects were confronted with four interaction contexts
(in random order) of 20 rounds each, in groups of ﬁve. At the start of
each session, subjects received written general instructions that were also
read aloud by the experimenters. Before each interaction context, groups
were reshufﬂed randomly, and subjects received speciﬁc instructions on their
computer screens (see SI for screen shots and the general instructions of
both parts). After this, subjects completed a short questionnaire to ensure
they had understood the payoff-structure of the following context. In Part
1, decision-making was framed in a context of a choice between planting
different crops on a farm. In Part 2, the context of decision-making was
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framed as investment choices in a stock market. The basic payoff structures
of the contexts were the same between both parts, but the payoffs, noise
on payoffs, and information cost in Part 2 were scaled with a factor 1.5
compared to Part 1 (here, values for Part 1 are given). Subjects were not
aware of the identity of their group members, and were unable to see the
computer screens of other participants. The experiment was run with the
experimental software z-Tree (56) (code available upon request).
In each context, subjects decided between two options that remained
the same in all rounds of that context (we used actual crop names (Part 1)
and ﬁctitious company names (Part 2), but here we will refer to the options
as A and B). All subjects made their choice simultaneously, and were then
shown the resulting payoff. Before each decision, subjects could choose to
collect information about the members of their group, at a cost of 2 points.
At the end of Part 2, subjects were paid in private proportional to the payoffs
they had accumulated over both parts (100 points = 1 euro; mean earnings
of subjects that participated in both parts: € 69.93; max earnings: € 94.30;
min earnings € 50.40). We ensured that participants could not end with a
negative point total, by giving them a large enough endowment at the start
of the experiment. Sessions lasted for approximately 90 minutes.
In the social dilemma (see SI for other contexts), payoffs of choosing
respectively A and B in Part 1 were given by and
, where p denotes the fraction of subjects in the group that chose
option A, and ε is a stochastic component, drawn from a normal distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation σ ( ). The one-shot version of this
game has a single Nash equilibrium at , even though all subjects obtain
a higher payoff at . This shows that collective interests and individual
interests are opposed to each other in this context.
Simulations were programmed in C++ (code available upon request).We
tracked the cultural evolution of cooperation through 20 rounds for groups
consisting either of only frequency-based learners or only payoff-based
learners. In each round, individuals received payoffs for cooperation and
defection as in the experiment (including noise on payoffs). Individuals used
social information with a 36% probability (as in the experiment). If they did
not request information, they had a 63% or 16% probability to cooperate,
depending on whether they cooperated or defected in the previous round
(as in the experiment). If they did request information, the probability of
cooperation was determined by the logistic regressions shown in Figure 3.
Success-based learners viewed two randomly chosen peers – if both these
individuals had the same behavior as the focal individual in the previous
round, the focal individual was assumed to stay with their previous behavior
(with a probability of 1% to switch).
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